Efficiency and Optimality of Largest Deficit First Prioritization:
  Resource Allocation for Real-Time Applications by Du, Yuhuan & de Veciana, Gustavo
AEfficiency and Optimality of Largest Deficit First Prioritization:
Resource Allocation for Real-Time Applications
YUHUAN DU and GUSTAVO DE VECIANA, The University of Texas at Austin
An increasing number of real-time applications with compute and/or communication deadlines are being
supported on shared infrastructure. Such applications can often tolerate occasional deadline violations with-
out substantially impacting their Quality of Service (QoS). A fundamental problem in such systems is de-
ciding how to allocate shared resources so as to meet applications’ QoS requirements. A simple framework
to address this problem is to, (1) dynamically prioritize users as a possibly complex function of their deficits
(difference of achieved vs required QoS), and (2) allocate resources so to expedite users with higher prior-
ity. This paper focuses on a general class of systems using such priority-based resource allocation. We first
characterize the set of feasible QoS requirements and show the optimality of max weight-like prioritization.
We then consider simple weighted Largest Deficit First (w-LDF) prioritization policies, where users with
higher weighted QoS deficits are given higher priority. The paper gives an inner bound for the feasible set
under w-LDF policies, and, under an additional monotonicity assumption, characterizes its geometry lead-
ing to a sufficient condition for optimality. Additional insights on the efficiency ratio of w-LDF policies, the
optimality of hierarchical-LDF and characterization of clustering of failures are also discussed.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Soft real-time applications, cloud-computing, largest deficit first prioriti-
zation, feasibility region, feasibility optimal, geometry of inner bound, class-based hierarchical prioritization
1. INTRODUCTION
A growing number of real-time applications with compute and/or communication dead-
lines are being moved onto shared infrastructure, e.g., ranging from embedded systems
to efficient cloud infrastructure. Such applications include control, multimedia pro-
cessing, and/or machine learning components associated with enabling various types
of user services as well as wireless, intelligent transportation and energy systems. In
many cases such applications can tolerate occasional deadline violations, i.e., have soft
constraints, without impacting the application Quality of Service (QoS). For example,
applications with feedback can quickly compensate for errors, or humans may toler-
ate occasional failures in video processing since they can be partially concealed, or
wireless base stations can tolerate occasional frame losses, since these can be retrans-
mitted. More generally real-time applications’ long-term QoS may depend in a complex
manner on what was accomplished on time, e.g., partial completion of a set of tasks, or
notions of video quality.
Enabling efficient sharing of compute/communication resources is a challenging
problem. On the one hand, even for a single resource, tying the sharing model, e.g.,
round robin, priority schemes, to QoS metrics is generally hard due to the uncer-
tainty in applications’ workloads and possible variations in processing speeds. On
the other hand, today’s applications leverage complex networks of heterogeneous com-
pute/communication resources, e.g., multi-core computers, embedded network system,
or combinations of computation on mobile devices and the cloud. Consider the exam-
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ple in Figure 1. User 1 periodically generates a task that needs to be processed se-
quentially on Resources A, B, C, D in each period while User 2 generates tasks to be
processed on Resource B then C. How should one go about designing resource sharing
policies across multiple heterogeneous resources, where parallelism, task preemption
and migration are allowed? Furthermore, how can one address heterogeneous QoS re-
quirements associated with real-time applications? For example, User 1’s QoS may
still benefit from partial completions while User 2 only benefits if all processing is
completed. This general class of problems involving both heterogeneous resources and
user QoS requirements is the focus of this paper.
User 2
BA C D
User 1
Fig. 1. An example for a network of resources. A, B, C and D represent compute/communication resources.
Tasks from User 1 need to be processed on A, B, C, D while tasks from User 2 require processing on B, C.
The design space of possible solutions to this problem is huge and has been explored
in many research communities. In this paper we study an approach to resource alloca-
tion based on a decomposition of concerns:
(1) user priorities are dynamically set based on the history outcomes;
(2) and, resources are allocated so as to favor users with higher priority.
In such a framework there is quite a bit of latitude in choosing how priorities are set,
and in turn how these affect the allocation of resources. For example, users’ priorities
could be set based on measured deficits, the “difference” of the required and achieved
QoS, i.e., Largest Deficit First (LDF) prioritization. In turn, for complex systems such
as that in Figure 1, resources could be allocated greedily giving preemptive access to
tasks associated with higher-priority users.
In general an optimal user prioritization strategy could leverage detailed informa-
tion regarding how these priorities will impact the allocation of resources and comple-
tion outcomes to achieve the best possible user QoS. Such strategies require excessive
amounts of information regarding the underlying compute/communication resources
and resource allocation mechanism, and thus are generally hard to implement. By
contrast, LDF-based prioritization is quite intuitive. It requires only tracking of users’
possibly heterogeneous QoS deficits, in this sense it is truly decoupling user prioritiza-
tion from the underlying priority-based resource allocation. Unfortunately, it is known
to be suboptimal in certain settings [Dimakis and Walrand 2006; Joo et al. 2007; Kang
et al. 2013].
A theoretical study of the efficiency and, possibly optimality, of LDF-based priori-
tization systems supporting real-time users with heterogeneous QoS requirements is
the main focus of this paper. We note, however, that we do not directly address the de-
sign of the underlying priority-based resource allocation, although we consider some
natural characteristics it could have to ensure optimality when combined with LDF
user prioritization.
Related Work. There have been much work studying dynamic prioritization poli-
cies in the context of diverse resource, workload and/or QoS models.
The authors in [Hou and Kumar 2012; Hou and Kumar 2013] propose a framework
to model a wireless access point serving a set of clients that in each period generate
packets which need to be transmitted by the end of the period. In their model only
one client can transmit at a time and thus the access point can be viewed as a single
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resource. Each client transmits its packets over an unreliable channel which has a
fixed probability of success, and thus, the time to successfully transmit a packet can
be modeled as a geometric random variable. In this setting the authors show that the
LDF policy is “optimal.” However, the results are restricted to a single resource shared
by users with geometric workloads. In this paper we study the performance of LDF in
a more general setting which includes this prior work as a special case. This initial
set of papers motivated follow-up work in wireless context, see e.g., [Hou and Kumar
2014; Munir et al. 2010; Jaramillo and Srikant 2011].
The performance of LDF and similar policies has also been studied in [McKeown
1995; Dimakis and Walrand 2006; Joo et al. 2007; Kang et al. 2013]. The authors
in [Dimakis and Walrand 2006] consider the generalized switch model and were the
first to propose the notion of “local pooling” as a sufficient condition for the Longest
Queue First (LQF) policy to be throughput optimal. Subsequently, the work in [Joo
et al. 2007] considers a multi-hop wireless network under a node-exclusive interference
model and shows that the efficiency ratio of the greedy maximal matching policy, which
is essentially LQF, equals to the “local pooling” factor of the network graph. More
recently, the authors in [Kang et al. 2013] consider real-time traffic in ad hoc wireless
networks under a link-interference model and also characterize the efficiency ratio of
the LDF policy.
The results in [Dimakis and Walrand 2006; Joo et al. 2007; Kang et al. 2013] depend
on the constant service rate model and the specific interference model, i.e., where the
set of links/queues that can be scheduled simultaneously is restricted. These models
may be appropriate in some wireless/queueing networks but do not necessarily hold in
our broader context, e.g., soft real-time applications with stochastic workloads. Also,
[Dimakis and Walrand 2006] lacks a performance analysis of LQF when it is not opti-
mal and the works in [Joo et al. 2007; Kang et al. 2013] focus on the efficiency ratio of
LDF-like policies but lack a characterization of the full capacity region of these poli-
cies. Moreover, when the system can deliver more than the requirements, either the
QoS requirements for real-time traffic or the throughput requirements for queueing
systems, there is no discussion of how to manage the allocation of the “excess capacity”
across users.
The authors in [Tassiulas and Ephremides 1992; Tassiulas and Ephremides 1993;
McKeown et al. 1999; Dai and Prabhakar 2000; Stolyar 2004] propose max weight
scheduling policies for different types of queueing systems and show them to be
throughput optimal via the approaches summarized in [Down and Meyn 1994; Down
and Meyn 1997; Meyn and Tweedie 2008]. The authors in [Neely 2009] and [van de
Ven et al. 2013] further characterize the delay of the max weight policy, and study
its inefficiency in spatial wireless networks, respectively. As we will see in the sequel
we too discuss a max weight-like scheduling policy, but it suffers from the usual com-
plexity problems when the decision space is large and it requires excessive amounts of
information, motivating us to consider simpler policies.
Additional related work includes work on modeling and scheduling of real-time
tasks, see e.g., [Sha et al. 2004; Davis and Burns 2011; Li and Ierapetritou 2008;
Shakkottai and Srikant 2002].
Our Contributions. In this paper, we contribute to the theoretical understand-
ing and performance characterization of the Largest Deficit First (LDF) policy with
applications to resource allocation to support real-time services. We make three key
contributions.
First, we propose a novel general model for a class of systems supporting priority-
based resource allocation and study different dynamic prioritization policies. This
model is general in terms of the “impact” the priority decisions can have on the QoS
payoffs. Specifically, in each period the payoffs under a priority decision are modeled
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by a random vector, which includes as special cases the single resource model, the ge-
ometric/constant workload and/or specific interference model adopted in prior work.
For this general model, we propose a general inner bound RIB for the QoS feasibility
region of LDF prioritization policy.
Second, with an additional property, monotonicity in payoffs, we characterize the
geometry of the inner bound RIB. Based on this, we further propose a sufficient condi-
tion for the optimality of the LDF policy and characterize the efficiency ratio of LDF.
In practice, understanding the geometry of RIB enables us to understand and identify
possible bottlenecks in the priority-based resource allocation infrastructure. We also
show that the LDF policies (as well as a hierarchical-LDF version) are optimal when
there are two classes of exchangeable users.
Finally, we also consider the class of weighted LDF policies, which enable us to ex-
plore the allocation of “excess payoffs” when the system has “excess” capacity. Sim-
ulation results are exhibited to show the impact of weights and to characterize the
clustering of failures.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our
general model for systems supporting priority-based resource allocation. Section 3
develops theoretical results and characterizes the performance of the weighted LDF
policies while Section 4 presents some examples for the optimality of the weighted
LDF/hierarchical-LDF policies. Section 5 discusses some practical issues while the im-
pact of weights is exhibited via simulation in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper
and points to future work. Some of the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider applications which periodically generate random workloads with the same
period and specify long-term QoS requirements. In the sequel we let a user denote a
specific instance of such an application.
We begin by introducing a general model for systems that allocate resources in each
period based on the following decomposition: (1) users are assigned priorities dynam-
ically, e.g., at runtime, according to a function of the past history, and (2) the system
allocates resources based on these priorities.
For the most part in this paper, the manner in which (2) is carried out will not be
our concern. Instead our focus will be on how to perform dynamic user prioritization
to achieve optimal (or near-optimal) system performance when combined with a given
underlying mechanism for (2). In our follow-up work [Du and de Veciana 2016], we
consider a specific system model and study the combined design of (1) and (2).
2.1. General Model for Systems Supporting Priority-Based Resource Allocation
We consider an abstract system that serves n users indexed from 1 to n. Let N =
{1, 2, · · · , n} be the user set. The system operates in discrete time, over periods t =
1, 2, · · · . In each period, it picks a user priority decision d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) where dm is
the index of the user with mth highest priority. We let D denote the set of all possible
priority decisions and let |D| represent the number of possible decisions, thus, |D| = n!
In each period, given the priority decision d passed to the underlying resources,
since there are intrinsic uncertainties in users’ workloads, each user i achieves a non-
negative random QoS payoff, denoted by Vi(d). We let V(d) = (V1(d), V2(d), · · · , Vn(d)).
We assume the payoffs are independent across periods. The distribution of V(d) de-
pends on the selected priority decision d and the expected payoff vector given d ∈ D is
denoted by p(d) = E[V(d)]. We assume all possible payoff vectors form a finite rational
set. Moreover, we naturally assume that for each user i ∈ N , there exists a decision d
such that pi(d) > 0.
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Each user requires a long-term average QoS payoff qi ≥ 0 as the QoS requirement.
We let q = (q1, q2, · · · , qn) and assume qi’s are rational1. We denote by d(t) the priority
decision at period t. To keep track of the deficits between required and achieved QoS
payoffs, for each user i ∈ N and period t+ 1, we define2
Xi(t+ 1) = [Xi(t) + qi − Vi(d(t+ 1))]+, (1)
where [x]+ = max[x, 0].
The goal is thus to devise user prioritization policies which will meet users’ long-
term payoff requirements.
Definition 2.1. A user prioritization policy is a stationary policy that picks a
priority decision d(t+ 1) ∈ D at period t+ 1 based on the following:
- users’ payoff requirement vector q;
- expected payoff vectors P = {p(d)|d ∈ D};
- and, the deficits X(t) = (X1(t), X2(t), · · · , Xn(t)).
The process {X(t)}t≥1 is a Markov chain under any such policy. We assume the ini-
tial state X(0), the requirements q, the set of all possible payoff vectors and the user
prioritization policy make {X(t)}t≥1 an irreducible Markov chain.
Definition 2.2. A payoff requirement vector q is said to be feasible if there ex-
ists a user prioritization policy η under which the Markov chain {X(t)}t≥1 is positive
recurrent. We also say this policy fulfills this requirement vector.
The expected payoff vectors P = {p(d)|d ∈ D} could in principle be statistically
inferred from the history events or by repeated experiments. However, in a practical
setting this can be challenging and it is of interest to find a policy that performs well
and uses little a-priori information regarding the exponential set of expected payoff
vectors P .
Note that this model is general in the sense that the “impact” of priority decisions
d ∈ D on the QoS payoff vectors P is at this point general, whereas the specific resource
and workload models in prior work, e.g., [Dimakis and Walrand 2006; Joo et al. 2007;
Kang et al. 2013], implicitly impose properties on P and therefore restrict the results
significantly.
2.2. Example: Centralized Computing System for Real-Time Applications
Our model can for example capture a centralized computing infrastructure supporting
Soft Real-Time (SRT) applications where the n users share compute resources. In a
cloud-based collaborative video conferencing context, a user might correspond to an
individual end user and the period length might correspond to the length of a group of
video frames.
The users generate streams of tasks periodically. Specifically in each period a user
generates several tasks. A task may further consist of a graph of possibly depen-
dent sub-tasks with (possibly) random processing requirements, i.e., workloads. These
tasks/sub-tasks need to be fully completed before the end of the period. For real-time
services, it is generally useless to process a task after its deadline. For example, in the
video conferencing context it is not desirable to present an out-of-date frame. There-
fore, we assume tasks/sub-tasks not completed on time are dropped.
1All the results in this paper can be generalized to models with irrational values. For simplicity in the proof
we do not consider that level of generality.
2We truncate the deficit at 0 for the convenience of defining feasibility in the sequel. Removing the truncation
won’t change the results in the paper.
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In each period t, the user prioritization policy picks a user priority decision d(t),
based on which compute resources are allocated to process tasks. Given the task pro-
cessing results, a payoff Vi(d(t)) is achieved for each user i based on whether the tasks
were successfully processed, or how much of the task graphs were completed. In gen-
eral, Vi(d(t)) may represent any user-specific QoS payoff per period, that can be aver-
aged over time, e.g., the quality/resolution of video frame processing, or the number
of task completions. Accordingly the vector q represents the long-term average QoS
requirements.
2.3. Example: Complex Networks and Flexible Modeling of Application Execution Payoffs
As indicated in the introduction, our model also applies to a complex network of het-
erogeneous compute and communication resources, as long as users periodically and
synchronously generate tasks that require timely processing on diverse resources and
moving around in the network, e.g., as shown in Figure 1.
Given the priority decision in each period, the network of resources coordinate ac-
cording to some priority-based resource allocation mechanism to accelerate the pro-
cessing of tasks with high priorities, by reducing the communication/queueing delays,
processing with higher processor speed, allocating more shared resources, etc.
Again, different users can define their payoffs in different ways and specify their
QoS requirements accordingly.
3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we shall develop theoretical results for such systems. Some of these
results are similar to prior work but in the more general model while other results
are completely new. For completeness we shall develop a self-contained theoretical
framework.
3.1. System Feasibility Region and Feasibility Optimal Policy
The set of all feasible long-term payoff requirement vectors will be referred to as the
system feasibility region F . We let Fη denote the feasibility region of a user prioritiza-
tion policy η. To characterize F we introduce some further notation.
A vector x is said to be dominated by a vector y if xi ≤ yi for all i and is denoted by
x  y. We define x ≺ y, x  y and x  y in a similar manner.
Given the set of priority decisions D and the expected payoff vectors P = {p(d)|d ∈
D}, we let C be the set of requirement vectors q ∈ Rn+ which are dominated by a vector
in the convex hull of P denoted Conv(P ), i.e.,
C ≡ {q ∈ Rn+ | ∃x ∈ Conv(P ) such that q  x}. (2)
Figure 2 exhibits C for a two-user (left figure) and three-user (right figure) setting. In
the two-user setting, the points labeled p(d1) and p(d2) are the expected payoff vectors
of two priority decisions, i.e., where User 1 or User 2 has higher priority, respectively.
The shadowed area represents C. In the three-user setting, the circles represent the
6 possible expected payoff vectors, and the region dominated by their convex hull is
C. Note that in a n-user scenario where n ≥ 3, as displayed the expected payoff vec-
tors need not be on a hyperplane in the n-dimensional space. As we will see this is
essentially the source of complexity in studying such systems.
Clearly, for any requirement vector q in the interior of C, denoted by int(C), one can
achieve q if one is allowed to do probabilistic time sharing among priority decisions
by picking decisions according to a pre-computed probability distribution whose mean
payoff dominates q. Therefore, int(C) ⊆ F . We can also show the following result.
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Fig. 2. Examples of set C when n = 2 and n = 3.
LEMMA 3.1. The system feasibility region F is such that
F ⊆ cl(C),
where cl(C) is the closure of C.
Intuitively, if q is feasible, it is fulfilled by some user prioritization policy that in the
long-term picks each priority decision some fraction of the time and thus, q is domi-
nated by some point in the convex hull of P . This is similar to prior work, e.g., [Tassi-
ulas and Ephremides 1992]. See the appendix for a detailed proof. In other words, C
is different from F by at most a boundary, and therefore, characterizes F for practical
purposes. Thus, in the sequel we will also refer to C as the system feasibility region.
Ideally, it is desirable to devise an “optimal” policy that can fulfill all feasible require-
ments. More formally, a user prioritization policy η is said to be feasibility optimal if
int(C) ⊆ Fη ⊆ cl(C). Similar to prior work [Tassiulas and Ephremides 1992; Tassiu-
las and Ephremides 1993], the following max weight-like policy is one such feasibility
optimal policy.
Definition 3.2. The deficit-based max weight (MW) prioritization policy is such
that, at period t + 1, given the deficit vector X(t) computed by (1), it picks a priority
decision d(t+ 1) that satisfies
d(t+ 1) ∈ argmax
d∈D
〈X(t),p(d)〉, (3)
where 〈x,y〉 is the inner product of two vectors.
THEOREM 3.3. The system feasibility region F and the feasibility region of the MW
policy FMW are related to C as follows,
int(C) ⊆ FMW ⊆ F ⊆ cl(C),
and therefore, the MW policy is feasibility optimal.
See Appendix 8.2 for the proof.
However, the MW policy and time sharing policies require full knowledge of P which
is challenging in complex practical systems. Moreover, these policies are hard to im-
plement since they involve solving fairly complex optimization problems, i.e., Eq (3).
Changes in the user set or payoff requirement vector q will also impact the realization
of these policies. In summary, the requirements in terms of a-priori knowledge, the
computational complexity and lack of flexibility to changes make them hard to use in
practice. This motivates the policies considered in the next subsection.
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For ease of reference, Table I provides a summary of the notation used to denote
various regions used in the rest of the paper—some of these are introduced in the
sequel.
Table I. Notation of regions.
Regions Description
F System Feasibility Region.
Conv(P ) Convex hull of the expected payoff vectors.
C Region dominated by Conv(P ).
Fw-LDF Feasibility region of the w-LDF policy.
RIB An inner bound for Fw-LDF
B Dominant of the convex hull.
R Region characterizing the geometry of RIB.
3.2. Weighted LDF Policies and Associated Feasibility Regions
The LDF user prioritization policies require no a-priori knowledge of the system, are
simple to implement and adapt easily to changes in q or the user set. In particular we
shall characterize the feasibility regions of these policies by providing an inner bound.
Definition 3.4. Given a vector w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn)  0, the weighted Largest
Deficit First (w-LDF) user prioritization policy is such that, at period t+1, given the
deficit vector X(t), it picks a priority decision d that satisfies
wd1Xd1(t) ≥ wd2Xd2(t) ≥ · · · ≥ wdnXdn(t),
with ties broken arbitrarily (possibly randomly). In other words, it sorts the weighted
deficits of users and assigns priorities accordingly. Let 1 ≡ (1, 1, · · · , 1). We refer to the
policy with w = 1 the Largest Deficit First (LDF) policy.
Clearly, the w-LDF prioritization policies do not require knowledge of the expected
payoff vectors P . Note that we still use deficit feedback to stabilize the system. In terms
of computational complexity, solving (3) is O(n!) while sorting weighted deficits only
requires O(n log n). It also allows us to further differentiate the performance across
users by assigning different weights. The impact of weights is discussed in Section 6.
Prior work has established that the LDF policy need not be feasibility optimal.
Therefore, a key question is whether the feasibility regions for the w-LDF policies
are acceptable and to characterize the gap between their feasibility regions and the
system feasibility region F . To that end, we first provide an inner bound, denoted by
RIB, for the feasibility region of any w-LDF policy.
THEOREM 3.5. For any w  0, an inner bound for the feasibility region of the w-
LDF policy Fw-LDF is given by int(RIB) ⊆ Fw-LDF, where
RIB ≡ {q ∈ Rn+ | ∃α  0 such that ∀S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
αiqi ≤ min
d∈D(S)
∑
i∈S
αipi(d)} (4)
where D(S) denotes the set of all priority decisions that assign the highest |S| priorities
to users in S.
In other words, if q ∈ RIB, it is feasible under all w-LDF policies except perhaps
boundary points. The underlying intuition for this bound is as follows. A vector q is in
RIB if there is a weight vector α  0 such that for any subset of users S, and decisions
giving users in S the highest priorities, the weighted sum of payoff requirement
∑
i∈S
αiqi
will not exceed the least sum weighted payoff
∑
i∈S
αipi(d). Based on α, we can construct
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an appropriate Lyapunov function to show feasibility for q and each w. See Appendix
8.3 for the proof.
Understanding the geometry of RIB enables us to characterize the performance gap
between w-LDF and feasibility optimal policies. Let us informally consider the geom-
etry of RIB for the two special cases in Figure 2. In the two-user case in Figure 2, RIB
is the same as C and thus, the w-LDF policies are feasibility optimal. However, in the
three-user case in Figure 2, this need not be true. Indeed, in this setting, the region
RIB corresponds to C minus the convex hull of P , modulo some boundary points. This
is exhibited in Figure 3. In the next subsection, we will formalize these observations
and show under what conditions they hold true.
1
_ =
Fig. 3. Visualizing RIB for the three-user scenario in Figure 2. In this example, the expected payoff vectors
P = {p(d)|d ∈ D} are not on the same hyperplane and RIB = cl(C − Conv(P )).
3.3. Geometry of RIB under Monotonicity in Payoffs
In order to formally characterize the geometry of RIB we will add a further natural
requirement to the general model.
We define Si(d) to be the set of users that have higher priorities than user i under
decision d.
Definition 3.6. The system with expected payoff vectors P = {p(d)|d ∈ D} is said
to satisfy monotonicity in individual expected payoff if, for any two priority deci-
sions d1 and d2 and any user i such that Si(d1) ⊆ Si(d2), it is true that pi(d1) ≥ pi(d2).
We call this monotonicity in payoffs for short.
In other words, a user i can expect to get a higher payoff if some users with higher
priority are re-assigned lower priorities. This property characterizes in a broad sense
how priorities impact the expected payoffs when the underlying system allocates re-
sources. It is a natural condition but need not hold in general.
We shall define B to be the set of payoff requirement vectors q which dominate a
vector in the convex hull of P , i.e.,
B ≡ {q ∈ Rn+ | ∃x ∈ Conv(P ) such that q  x}.
We call B the dominant of the convex hull. Contrast this to the definition of C in (2).
For the special cases in Figure 2 and 3, B∩C equals to Conv(P ), but in general it can
be larger than Conv(P ). Figure 4 shows a conceptual picture of what could happen.
The three circles represent three possible expected payoff vectors. Here, the whole
shadowed area B ∩ C is larger than the region Conv(P ) which is the triangle formed
by the three circles. Note that this is only a conceptual example to help visualize B∩C
in higher dimensions. In reality for two dimensions, i.e., systems with two users, we
know there are only 2 expected payoff vectors as shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 4. An example where B ∩ C is larger than Conv(P ).
In the sequel we will see that given monotonicity in payoffs, RIB is obtained by “re-
moving” B ∩ C, rather than just Conv(P ) from C. To develop this result we need some
further notation associated with each subset of users S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
The projection of a vector x on the subspace of S is denoted by xS , i.e.,
xSi =
{
xi if i ∈ S
0 otherwise.
We let PS ≡ {pS(d)|d ∈ D(S)} represent the projections of expected payoff vectors
corresponding to decisions in D(S), i.e., which assign the highest priorities to users in
S.
Given a subset S and PS , we define the feasibility region CS and the dominant of
the convex hull BS as follows.
CS ≡ {qS ∈ Rn+ | ∃xS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS  xS},
BS ≡ {qS ∈ Rn+ | ∃xS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS  xS}.
Note that CS and BS are not necessarily the same as projecting C and B on the
subspace of S, respectively. This is because in the definitions of CS and BS , we only
focus on a subset of decisions D(S) rather that the full decision set D.
Let us now define a region R which will help characterize the geometry of the inner
bound RIB.
Definition 3.7. Let R be defined as follows:
R ≡ {q ∈ Rn+ | ∀S ⊆ N,qS ∈ CS \BS},
where CS \ BS = {qS |qS ∈ CS ,q /∈ BS}. In other words, any q ∈ R satisfies that for
any user subset S, its projection on the subspace of S belongs to the set CS \BS , which
is the feasibility region CS minus the dominant of the convex hull BS .
One can visualize obtaining the set R as a process of removing BS ∩ CS from CS in
all subspaces corresponding to all subsets S. The geometry of RIB is then captured as
follows.
THEOREM 3.8. If the system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, then the inner bound
region RIB is such that
int(R) ⊆ RIB ⊆ cl(R).
See Appendix 8.4 for this somewhat intricate argument.
3.4. Sufficient Condition for w-LDF’s Optimality
By Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.8, we immediately get
int(R) ⊆ int(RIB) ⊆ Fw-LDF. (5)
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Since R is obtained by removing BS ∩ CS from CS for each S, if what is removed is
nothing more than a boundary, the difference between R and C is at most a boundary
and thus w-LDF policies are feasibility optimal. It is easy to see this happens when
vectors in PS lie on a hyperplane for each subset of users S. This can be formalized as
follows.
Definition 3.9. The system with expected payoff vectors P = {p(d)|d ∈ D} is said
to satisfy subset payoff equivalence if for each subset of users S the vectors in
PS = {pS(d)|d ∈ D(S)} lie on a hyperplane, i.e., there exists a nonzero αS  0 such
that for all d1,d2 ∈ D(S),
〈αS ,pS(d1)〉 = 〈αS ,pS(d2)〉.
THEOREM 3.10. If the system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs and subset payoff
equivalence, then
int(C) ⊆ Fw-LDF ⊆ cl(C),
and therefore, the w-LDF policies are feasibility optimal.
Please refer to Appendix 8.7 for detailed proof.
The conditions for this theorem are akin but not equivalent to the conditions intro-
duced in [Dimakis and Walrand 2006] for the generalized switch model. Specifically,
we require the system to satisfy monotonicity in payoffs and subset payoff equivalence.
The work in [Dimakis and Walrand 2006] requires local pooling in the generalized
switch model. In the model in [Dimakis and Walrand 2006], given a priority decision
d = (d1, d2, · · · , dn) where di is the index of the queue with the the ith highest priority,
the queue service rate vector can be denoted by m(d), where mdi(d) represents the
units of work that can be removed from queue di in one time slot under priority deci-
sion d. m(d) is akin to p(d) in our context. However, the generalized switch model in
[Dimakis and Walrand 2006] implies properties on the service rate vectors m(d). For
example, it implies that for all d = (d1, d2, · · · , dn), we have md1(d) ≥ md1(d′) for all
d′, and md2(d) ≥ md2(d′) for all d′ satisfying md1(d) = md1(d′), etc. These implicit re-
quirements do not necessarily hold in systems which satisfy the conditions in Theorem
3.10.
If the system has only two users, then clearly subset payoff equivalence is satis-
fied since the two expected payoff vectors are always on a line. Therefore, we get the
following corollary.
COROLLARY 3.11. If the system has two users and satisfies monotonicity in payoffs,
then w-LDF policies are feasibility optimal.
Note that in a two-user scenario, the property of monotonicity in payoffs simply
means a user gets higher payoff under the higher priority than its payoff under the
lower priority. In Section 4.2 we will consider systems serving two classes of exchange-
able users and use this corollary to show the optimality of LDF-like policies.
3.5. Efficiency Ratio Analysis
When the conditions in Theorem 3.10 do not hold, one can still study the efficiency
ratio, see e.g., [Joo et al. 2007], to evaluate the performance of w-LDF policies.
Definition 3.12. The efficiency ratio of the w-LDF policy is defined as
γw-LDF = sup{γ|γF ⊆ Fw-LDF}.
Clearly γw-LDF equals to 1 if and only if the w-LDF policy is feasibility optimal.
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If a system does not satisfy subset payoff equivalence, i.e., for some subset of users
S the vectors in PS are not on the same hyperplane, we can characterize the “hetero-
geneity” of these vectors based on the following notion.
Definition 3.13. Given a subset of users S ⊆ N , the subset payoff ratio σS for S
is defined as
σS = max
αS0
αS 6=0
min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉
max
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉 . (6)
The optimal αS is such that the projections of the vectors in PS on αS are as close to
each other as possible.
Clearly if the vectors in PS are on the same hyperplane, then σS = 1 and the optimal
αS is the normal vector to the hyperplane. Intuitively, σS characterizes the degree to
which the vectors in PS deviate from being on the same hyperplane.
This notion enables us to characterize the efficiency ratio of w-LDF for a given sys-
tem.
THEOREM 3.14. If the system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, the efficiency ratio
of the w-LDF policy is such that
γw-LDF ≥ min
S⊆N
σS .
See Appendix 8.8 for the proof. Intuitively, the bottleneck of the efficiency ratio is the
subset S where σS is the smallest.
Note that by picking any α  0, we can get lower bounds on σS for all subsets
S ⊆ N by placing its projection αS into (6). Thus, any α  0 enables us to construct a
lower bound on γw-LDF. A trivial option is α = 1, where for each subset S the value of
〈1S ,pS(d)〉 represents the sum payoff of users in S under decision d.
We have shown that the efficiency and optimality of the w-LDF policies is related to
RIB. Understanding and analyzing the geometry of RIB can in principle enable us to
provide feedback to the designers of priority-based resource allocation mechanisms re-
garding which specific priority decision or set of priority decisions are problematic and
bottlenecks for the system so that the designers can focus on improving the resource al-
location for these problematic decisions. For example, in the conceptual setting shown
in Figure 4, the priority decision corresponding to the lower left circle is the “bottle-
neck” of the system and should be targeted to make the dominant of the convex hull
as small as possible. This is of particular interest for some practical systems where it
is possible to get explicit knowledge of P which reflect the underlying priority-based
resource allocation, e.g., by collecting data over a long time.
A priority decision is problematic if the associated underlying resource allocation
suffers from resource contention, blocking among users/applications, or even deadlocks
on compute resources, etc. Based on feedback regarding the bottlenecks, the designer
could improve the associated resource allocation schemes, e.g., by increasing the pro-
cessing speed of the certain computing resources, spending more energy, reducing the
contention, and/or resolving the blocking/deadlock, and thus, improve the efficiency of
the overall system under the w-LDF prioritization policies.
4. EXAMPLES FOR W-LDF’S OPTIMALITY
Theorem 3.10 gives a sufficient condition for w-LDF to be feasibility optimal. One
example system that satisfies these conditions is the model considered in prior work
[Hou and Kumar 2012] which, as mentioned in Section 1, can be viewed as a single-
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resource geometric-workload model. In this section we consider more system settings
and show how our results provide useful insights in practice.
4.1. Exchangeable Expected Payoffs
We shall start by showing that for systems that are “symmetric”, w-LDF policies are
feasibility optimal.
Definition 4.1. A subset of users S is said to have exchangeable expected pay-
offs if, for all priority decisions d ∈ D and all i, j ∈ S, if we switch the priorities of user
i and j and use d′ to represent the resulting new priority decision, then
pk(d
′) =
{
pk(d) if k 6= i, j
pj(d) if k = i
pi(d) if k = j.
In other words, exchanging the priorities of two users in S will simply exchange their
expected payoffs without impacting that of other users. This would be true if the
priority-based resource allocation were symmetric for users in S and the users gen-
erate tasks with identically distributed or exchangeable workloads.
If the users in N have exchangeable expected payoffs, we can verify the property of
subset payoff equivalence by picking αS = 1S for each subset of users S. Therefore, by
Theorem 3.10 we get the following corollary.
COROLLARY 4.2. If the set of users N have exchangeable expected payoffs and the
system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, then the w-LDF policies are feasibility optimal.
See Appendix 8.9 for the proof.
4.2. Multiple Classes of Exchangeable Users and Hierarchical-LDF
In this subsection, we first consider a system supporting two classes of exchangeable
users. Formally, a class of users is exchangeable if they have exchangeable expected
payoffs and the same QoS requirement. The users in different classes may have dis-
tinct payoffs and QoS requirements. In some contexts it is of practical interest to first
prioritize the classes and then prioritize users in each class, respectively. We refer to
such schemes as using class-based hierarchical prioritization.
In practice, depending on whether the priorities of classes can change dynamically,
there are two types of class-based hierarchical prioritization: Type 1 where the class
priorities are fixed, and Type 2 where one can dynamically prioritize classes of users,
and then users within each class.
The first type of hierarchical prioritization might correspond to a setting where the
users/applications are separated into human-interactive/high-QoS and background-
processing/low-QoS categories [Gatherer 2015], and it is always desirable to first pro-
cess high-QoS users. In this setting, the problem is reduced to a collection of inde-
pendent user prioritization problems similar to the one considered in this paper. By
Corollary 4.2, w-LDF is feasibility optimal to prioritize users in each class.
The second type of dynamic hierarchical prioritization might be of interest in sys-
tems where switching between processing different user classes involves overheads,
and/or where it is inefficient to mix the processing of different user classes, probably
because of resource contention or deadlocks.
In this setting, we propose a class-based hierarchical-LDF policy that in each pe-
riod works in two steps by (1) prioritizing classes by LDF based on the aggregate
deficits, i.e., the sum of deficits for users in the same class, and (2) prioritizing users
in each class according to LDF based on individual users’ deficits. The framework of
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hierarchical-LDF is exhibited in Figure 5. Note that here LDF can be replaced by w-
LDF for any w  0 and the following result would hold.
…
Intra-class LDF
User
Class 1
…
Intra-class LDF
User
Class 2
Inter-class LDF
Fig. 5. The framework for class-based hierarchical-LDF policy.
THEOREM 4.3. In a system with two classes of exchangeable users, if the property
of monotonicity in payoffs is satisfied, the hierarchical-LDF policy is feasibility optimal
among all possible class-based hierarchical prioritization policies.
The proof follows directly from Corollary 3.11 and 4.2. By Corollary 3.11 we know
the class-based LDF policy is optimal to set priorities amongst the two classes and
by Corollary 4.2 we know the LDF-based user prioritization is also optimal for the
exchangeable users in each class.
More generally, for systems serving multiple (more than two) classes of exchangeable
users, one can view each class as a “super user”, and define the aggregate payoff and
QoS requirement for a super user to be the sum of payoffs and QoS requirements for
users in that class, respectively. Then the dynamic prioritization of super users can
be viewed as the problem considered in this paper. Therefore, by Theorem 3.10, if
the system with the super users’ expected aggregate payoffs satisfies monotonicity in
payoffs and subset payoff equivalence, the LDF policy is a feasibility optimal choice
for prioritizing super users and thus, the hierarchical-LDF policy is feasibility optimal
among all class-based hierarchical prioritization policies. Indeed, all the results we
have introduced, e.g., Theorem 3.3-3.14, still hold for the prioritization of these super
users.
5. SOME PRACTICAL ISSUES
In practice, besides meeting minimum payoff requirements, users may be willing to
pay for additional payoffs, e.g., better video quality in the video conferencing setting,
albeit at possibly different prices. Given the requirements q and the achieved average
payoffs p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn), we call pi − qi the excess payoff for each user i. While
using w-LDF policies to fulfill users’ payoff requirements, we also want to manage
the allocation of excess payoffs across users, perhaps with the aim of maximizing the
benefits to the system or users.
However, the non-negative definition of deficit (1) makes it hard to track excess pay-
offs. For example, consider a model with 2 users and suppose the payoff is always 1 for
the high priority user and 0 for the low priority user. Suppose the payoff requirement
vector is q = (0.1, 0.5). Since 1 > 0.1+0.5, we know q is feasible and the system can de-
liver 0.4 excess payoff. Suppose we use the LDF policy, starting from X(0) = (0, 0) it is
easy to verify3 that the system will switch giving high priority to these two users, and
3Since the payoffs are deterministic, we can verify this by evaluating the deficits for the first few periods
and we will observe that the process {X(t)}t≥1 evolves in a periodic pattern.
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thus the achieved average payoff vector is p = (0.5, 0.5). Clearly User 1 gets 0.4 excess
payoff while User 2 gets nothing. This happens because X1(t) and X2(t) are frequently
forced to 0 from different negative values, which causes the “unfairness” between these
two users.
To solve this problem, we modify the deficit definition for each user i and period t+1
as follows,
X ′i(t+ 1) = X
′
i(t) + qi − Vi(d(t+ 1)), (7)
i.e., we allow X ′i(t) to be negative.
Now for the simple example above, if we adopt LDF but based on the possibly nega-
tive deficits X′(t) = (X ′1(t), X ′2(t), · · · , X ′n(t)), we can get achieved average payoff vector
p = (0.3, 0.7). We observe that the two users equally split the excess payoff.
Intuitively, for each user i the modified deficit X ′i(t) changes roughly linearly as t
increases with the slope being qi − pi. Since w-LDF policy aims to balance weighted
deficit wiX ′i(t), we know wi(pi − qi) is roughly the same for all users. We will verify
this observation in the simulation section and based on this we can manage the excess
payoffs across users by picking the appropriate weight vector w.
Note that for completeness we will need to modify the feasibility definition since
the process {X′(t)}t≥1 is no longer positive recurrent as it may keep decreasing or
increasing. Now we call a payoff requirement vector q feasible if, under some user
prioritization policy, for each user i the time-averaged payoff per period is at least qi.
Formally, recall that Vi(d(t)) is the random payoff for user i in period t. As the payoff
requirement, each user i requires that
lim inf
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
Vi(d(t)) ≥ qi,with probability 1.
Note that this definition and Definition 2.2 are just two ways to define the feasibility.
With the theorem in [Blackwell 1956] we can show that for any user prioritization
policy, the sets of feasible QoS requirements under these two different feasibility def-
initions differ by at most a boundary and thus are equivalent for practical purposes.
Therefore, all the results we discuss in this paper hold under both feasibility defini-
tions.
6. SIMULATIONS
In this section we explore via simulation the impact of weights of w-LDF policies.
Consider an illustrative system with single computing resource serving 3 soft real-
time users. In each period of length δ = 10, each user generates one task that need to
complete by end of the period. We let the non-negative workload, i.e., task service time,
distributions for three users be Gamma(12, 0.5), Gamma(4, 1) and Gamma(10, 0.1), re-
spectively. We pick these workload distributions to make them general and hetero-
geneous. In each period, the payoff for user i is 1 if user i’s task completes and is 0
otherwise. Accordingly, user i’s QoS requirement qi represents the long-term task com-
pletion ratio.
We start with initial deficit X′(0) = (0, 0, 0). In each period, we independently gen-
erate task workloads for users and simulate the w-LDF policy based on X′(t) to pick a
priority decision. The single resource sequentially processes users’ tasks from highest
to lowest priority. Tasks not completed on time are dropped. All simulations are run
for 30000 periods. A requirement vector q is feasible if it is dominated by the achieved
task completion ratio vector p over the 30000 periods. The vectors q and w are specified
in various settings in the sequel.
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Note that in this setting monotonicity in payoffs is satisfied while subset payoff
equivalence is not.
6.1. Impact of Weights on Long-Term Completion Ratios
In Table II we consider a requirement vector q that is feasible under the w-LDF poli-
cies and display the achieved p under two different weight vectors w. For each weight
vector w, we verify that wi(pi − qi) is the same for all three users. Contrasting the two
lines in Table II, we can see that for a system which can deliver more than required,
changing the weight vector reallocates the excess payoffs and gives more excess payoffs
to users with smaller weights.
Table II. Achieved completion ratio vectors under two weight
vectors.
q w Achieved p wi(pi − qi)
0.8, 0.6, 0.4
(1, 1, 1) 0.85, 0.65, 0.45 0.05
(10, 1, 1) 0.809, 0.69, 0.49 0.09
6.2. Characterization of Clustering of Failures and Impact of Weights
If a user’s task is not completed in a period, we call it a failure event. The requirement
vector q focuses on long-term task completion ratio, but it would likely be undesirable
for a user to experience consecutive or clustered failure events. Figure 6 gives an ex-
ample of failure events. In this subsection we consider the same q = (0.8, 0.6, 0.4) used
above and explore the clustering of failures under two w-LDF policies.
Isolated 
Failure
Consecutive 
Failures
Inter-Failure Intervals
Fig. 6. Characteristics of clustering of failures.
We consider Inter-Failure Intervals (IFIs) between typical failures. IFI is supported
on the set {1, 2, 3, · · · }. To quantitatively evaluate the clustering of the failures, we
focus on the standard deviation (SD) of the IFIs for each user. One extreme case is
that failures happen strictly periodically and therefore, the SD is 0. Intuitively, a user
with a smaller IFI SD implies that the user experiences less clustered failures.
Next we introduce an evaluation benchmark. For each user i, we know 1 − pi rep-
resents the time-averaged failure ratio. If the failure happens in each period indepen-
dently with probability 1− pi, the IFI can be modeled by a geometric random variable
supported on the set {1, 2, 3, · · · } with the parameter being 1 − pi. We use the SD of
such a geometric random variable as a benchmark.
Under some w-LDF policy, we define SD ratio of user i to be the ratio of user i’s IFI
SD to the SD of the geometric random variable with parameter 1− pi. Table III shows
the SD ratios of three users under two different weight vectors w. Under w = (1, 1, 1),
the ratios are less than 1, indicating that the failures under the LDF policy are less
clustered compared to the scheme where failure event happens i.i.d. in each period.
The last two columns in Table III indicates that increasing the weight of user i reduces
the degree of failure clustering for user i but at the price of other users’ more clustered
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failures. Thus, the users’ sensitivities to clustered failures is another factor to consider
when one assigns weights to users.
Table III. Characterization of clustering of failures.
SD ratio under SD ratio under
w = (1, 1, 1) w = (10, 1, 1)
User 1 88% 39%
User 2 77% 97%
User 3 92% 107%
7. CONCLUSION
Resource allocation in complex systems supporting real-time users with general QoS
requirements can be relatively “easy”. One can in principle design the system to al-
low priority-based resource allocation and adopt simple w-LDF policies to dynamically
prioritize users/applications. Our theory provides guidance towards understanding the
suboptimality and even optimality of such solutions and how to improve the system de-
sign. For future work, it would be interesting to explore the management of real-time
users across systems and/or sharing with non real-time traffic.
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8. APPENDIX
8.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Given q ∈ F , since it is feasible there exists a user prioritization policy η that fulfills
q, i.e., the Markov chain {X(t)}t≥1 is positive recurrent, which implies there exists a
stationary distribution over the state space. Since η is a stationary policy that picks
d(t + 1) based on X(t), by Ergodic Theorem each priority decision d is selected with
some time fraction αd such that
∑
d∈D
αd = 1 . If we consider Xi(t) as a queue, the
average arrival qi should not be bigger than the average departure which is given by∑
d∈D
αdpi(d) since otherwise Xi(t) goes a.s. to infinity and the chain cannot be positive
recurrent.
Therefore,
q 
∑
d∈D
αdp(d) ∈ Conv(P ),
which implies q ∈ C ⊆ cl(C).
8.2. Proof of Theorem 3.3
We start by introducing a lemma.
LEMMA 8.1. A payoff requirement vector q is in C if and only if, for any non-
negative vector γ  0, there exists a priority decision d, such that
〈γ,q〉 ≤ 〈γ,p(d)〉.
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Equivalently, q is in C if and only if, for any γ  0,
〈γ,q〉 ≤ max
d∈D
〈γ,p(d)〉.
To understand this lemma, since any vector in C is dominated by some q ∈ Conv(P ),
we consider for simplicity a q ∈ Conv(P ). Such a vector can be expressed as a convex
combination of expected payoff vectors, i.e., q =
∑
d∈D
αdp(d), where
∑
d∈D
αd = 1 and
αd ≥ 0,∀d ∈ D.
Now we have
〈γ,q〉 =
∑
d∈D
αd〈γ,p(d)〉
≤
∑
d∈D
αdmax
d∈D
〈γ,p(d)〉
=max
d∈D
〈γ,p(d)〉.
This actually proves the necessity of the condition. The formal proof is shown below.
PROOF PROOF OF LEMMA 8.1. Given a payoff requirement vector q, by definition
of C, we know that q lying in set C is equivalent to the feasibility of the following set
of linear equations and inequalities,

q  ∑
d∈D
αdp(d)
αd ≥ 0,∀d ∈ D∑
d∈D
αd = 1.
(8)
The condition in Lemma 8.1 is equivalent to the infeasibility of{
γ  0
〈γ,q〉 > 〈γ,p(d)〉,∀d ∈ D. (9)
By strong duality [Boyd and Vandenberghe 2009] it is easy to prove that set (8) being
feasible is equivalent to set (9) being infeasible and this concludes the proof.
PROOF PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3. By Lemma 3.1 we know F ⊆ cl(C) and by defi-
nition we know FMW ⊆ F . To prove the theorem it suffices to show int(C) ⊆ FMW. We
show this by constructing a Lyapunov function and using Foster’s theorem.
Given q ∈ int(C), the goal is to show q can be fulfilled by the MW policy.
By definition of interior there exists  > 0 such that q′ = q + 1 ∈ C where 1 =
(1, 1, · · · , 1). We define a Lyapunov function as
L(X(t)) =
n∑
i=1
Xi(t)
2.
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In period t+ 1, we have
E [L(X(t+ 1))− L(X(t))|X(t) = x]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xi(t+ 1)
2 −Xi(t)2|X(t) = x
]
≤ E
[
n∑
i=1
(Xi(t) + qi − Vi(d(t+ 1)))2 −Xi(t)2|X(t) = x
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(qi − Vi(d(t+ 1)))2 + 2〈X(t),q−V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x
]
≤ E
[
n∑
i=1
(q2i + Vi(d(t+ 1))
2) + 2〈X(t),q−V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x
]
(10)
Under the MW policy, by (3) we know that
E[〈X(t),V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x]
= E[〈X(t),p(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x]
= max
d∈D
〈x,p(d)〉.
Since q′ = q+ 1 ∈ C, we get that
E[〈X(t),q−V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x]
= E[〈X(t),q′ −V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x]− 〈x,1〉
= 〈x,q′〉 −max
d∈D
〈x,p(d)〉 − 〈x,1〉
≤ −〈x,1〉,
where the last step is true by Lemma 8.1.
Also since there are finite payoff vectors, we use b1 to represent an upper bound on
all possible payoff values and payoff requirements. Therefore, by (10) we get that
E[L(X(t+ 1))− L(X(t))|X(t) = x] ≤ 2nb21 − 2〈x,1〉
≤ −1
for x satisfying 〈x,1〉 ≥ nb21 + 12 .
It is not hard to show4 there are finite states x with 〈x,1〉 < nb21 + 12 . Therefore, by
Foster’s theorem, {X(t)}t≥1 is positive recurrent and q is fulfilled by the MW policy.
Thus, this shows that int(C) ⊆ FMW.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 3.5
We first introduce some further notation. Given two vectors a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) and
b = (b1, b2, · · · , bn), we denote by a ◦ b = (a1b1, a2b2, · · · , anbn) the entrywise product.
For any w  0 and q ∈ int(RIB), the goal is to show that q can be fulfilled by the
w-LDF policy.
Let β = ( 1w1 ,
1
w2
, · · · , 1wn ). By definition of interior there exists an  > 0 such that
q′ = q + β ∈ RIB. By definition of RIB, there exists a vector α  0 such that q′ and α
satisfy the conditions (4).
4This is true because given our assumption that requirement q and the payoff vectors are rational valued
and have finite options, the state space of process {X(t)}t≥1 is in a lattice, see e.g., [Conway and Sloane
2013].
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Consider the following candidate Lyapunov function:
L(X(t)) =
n∑
i=1
αiwiXi(t)
2.
Note that we consider a process {X(t)}t≥1 that is driven by the w-LDF policy. In
period t+ 1, by similar analysis as in (10) we have that
E [L(X(t+ 1))− L(X(t))|X(t) = x]
≤ E
[
n∑
i=1
αiwi(q
2
i + Vi(d(t+ 1))
2) + 2〈α ◦w ◦X(t),q−V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
αiwi(q
2
i + Vi(d(t+ 1))
2) + 2〈α ◦w ◦X(t),q′ −V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x
]
−2〈x,α〉 (11)
Let d denote the priority decision selected according to w-LDF policy. Thus, We have
that
E [〈α ◦w ◦X(t),q′ −V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x]
= 〈α ◦w ◦ x,q′ − p(d)〉.
By reordering users according to priorities, we get
〈α ◦w ◦ x,q′ − p(d)〉
=
n∑
i=1
wdixdi [αdiq
′
di − αdipdi(d)]
=
n−1∑
i=1
[wdixdi − wdi+1xdi+1 ][
i∑
j=1
αdjq
′
dj −
i∑
j=1
αdjpdj (d)]
+wdnxdn [
n∑
j=1
αdjq
′
dj −
n∑
j=1
αdjpdj (d)].
By w-LDF policy we know wdixdi ≥ wdi+1xdi+1 . By (4) we have
i∑
j=1
αdjq
′
dj
≤
i∑
j=1
αdjpdj (d) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore,
E [〈α ◦w ◦X(t),q′ −V(d(t+ 1))〉|X(t) = x] ≤ 0.
Suppose b2 is an upper bound on all αi and wi, by (11), we get that
E[L(X(t+ 1))− L(X(t))|X(t) = x] ≤2nb22b21 − 2〈x,α〉
≤ − 1
for x satisfying 〈x,α〉 ≥ nb22b21 + 12 .
Again, since there are finite states x with 〈x,α〉 < nb22b21 + 12 , by Foster’s Theorem{X(t)}t≥1 is positive recurrent and q is fulfilled by the w-LDF policy.
Therefore, for any w  0, we have that
int(RIB) ⊆ Fw-LDF.
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8.4. Proof of Theorem 3.8
The proof of Theorem 3.8 is complicated and we apologize for that. Part of the compli-
cation comes from understanding how the property of monotonicity in payoffs charac-
terizes the geometry of the region RIB. Further, a feasible payoff requirement implies
feasibilities for all user subsets, and thus we need to look at the projections in all
subspaces.
Figure 7 gives the high-level outline for the proof of Theorem 3.8. There are two
parts which involve the technical results Lemma 8.2 and 8.3, which we will state in
the proof. In order to allow the reader follow the proof, we defer their own proof to
later.
Theorem 3.8
Part I: Lemma 8.2
Part II: Claim 1 Lemma 8.3
(By induction)(Letting
)
Fig. 7. Outline for the proof of Theorem 3.8.
LEMMA 8.2. If a system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, then for all q ∈ C and all
subsets of users S ⊆ N , qS ∈ CS .
We have argued in Section 3.3 that CS does not necessarily equal to the projection
of region C on the subspace of S in general, but the statement is true if the system
satisfies monotonicity in payoffs. Please refer to Appendix 8.5 for detailed proof of this
lemma.
Given a subset of users S ⊆ N , for two vectors pS and qS , we say pS S qS if pSi > qSi
for any i ∈ S. We define the subspace of S as RS+ = {q ∈ Rn+|qi = 0,∀i /∈ S}.
For a region X ⊆ Rn+ which lies in the subspace of S, we denote by intS(X) the
relative interior of X, i.e., the interior of X, relative to the subspace of S. Similarly we
use clS(X), bdS(X) to represent the relative closure and boundary ofX in the subspace
of S, respectively.
Following the definition of region R in Definition 3.7, we can express int(R) and cl(R)
as below,
int(R) = {q|∀S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n},qS ∈ intS(CS \BS)}, (12)
cl(R) = {q|∀S ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n},qS ∈ clS(CS \BS)}. (13)
By definition, we know CS and BS are closed sets. We can also show5
intS(CS \BS) = intS(CS) \BS ,
clS(CS \BS) = CS \ intS(BS).
Next we prove Theorem 3.8 in two parts: RIB ⊆ cl(R) and int(R) ⊆ RIB.
Part I of the proof:
We start with the easy part and first show RIB ⊆ cl(R).
5This is clear from the definition of CS and BS . We omit the proof to save space.
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Given q ∈ RIB, by definition, there exists α  0 such that for all subsets of users S,∑
i∈S
αiqi ≤ min
d∈D(S)
∑
i∈S
αipi(d),
i.e.,
〈αS ,qS〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉. (14)
To show q ∈ cl(R), by (13) we need to show for all subsets of users S that qS ∈
CS \ intS(BS).
Since q ∈ RIB ⊆ C, by Lemma 8.2 we have qS ∈ CS .
Now suppose for some subset of users S, qS ∈ intS(BS). By definition of BS and
interior, there exists xS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS  xS and qS 6= xS , which implies
that
〈αS ,qS〉 > 〈αS ,xS〉.
Since xS ∈ Conv(PS), there exists {cd|d ∈ D(S)} such that xS =
∑
d∈D(S)
cdp
S(d) and
cd ≥ 0,
∑
d∈D(S)
cd = 1. Therefore,
〈αS ,qS〉 > 〈αS ,xS〉 =
∑
d∈D(S)
cd〈αS ,pS(d)〉
≥ min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉, (15)
which is contradicted to (14). Therefore, qS /∈ intS(BS) and thus q ∈ cl(R), implying
that RIB ⊆ cl(R).
Part II of the proof:
For the second part we show int(R) ⊆ RIB.
Given q ∈ int(R), by (12), we know for all S, qS ∈ intS(CS) \BS . The goal is to show
q ∈ RIB, i.e., to find an α  0 such that for all subsets of users S,
〈αS ,qS〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉. (16)
We start with the following lemma which is proved in Appendix 8.6 in the sequel.
LEMMA 8.3. If a system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, given q ∈ int(R), for each
subset of users S, there exists nonzero βS  0, such that for all S′ ⊆ S where βS′ 6= 0,
〈βS′ ,qS′〉 < min
d∈D(S′)
〈βS′ ,pS′(d)〉. (17)
Given Lemma 8.3, by letting S = N we find β that is very similar to the α we are
looking for, except for two differences: (1) β may not be strictly positive, and (2) it is
strictly “less than” in (17). The idea is to add a small perturbation to β to construct a
strictly positive vector.
Formally, given Lemma 8.3, to show q ∈ RIB we shall prove the following even
stronger statement by induction.
Claim 1: If a system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, given q ∈ int(R), for each
subset of users S, there exists αS S 0 such that for all S′ ⊆ S,
〈αS′ ,qS′〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S′)
〈αS′ ,pS′(d)〉. (18)
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By Claim 1, let S = N , we can find α  0 satisfying (16) which implies q ∈ RIB.
Therefore, it suffices to prove Claim 1. We prove this by induction on the cardinality
|S| of user set S.
If |S| = 0, clearly Claim 1 is correct.
Suppose Claim 1 is correct for all S with |S| ≤ k − 1 where k ≥ 1. Given an S with
|S| = k, by Lemma 8.3, we can find nonzero βS  0 satisfying the conditions in Lemma
8.3. We separate the set S into two sets S1 and S2 where
βSi > 0, i ∈ S1,
βSi = 0, i ∈ S2.
Since βS 6= 0, |S2| ≤ |S| − 1 = k − 1. By induction of Claim 1 on S2, there exists
γS2 S2 0 such that for any S′ ⊆ S2,
〈γS′ ,qS′〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S′)
〈γS′ ,pS′(d)〉. (19)
We claim that for small enough δ > 0,
αS = βS + δγS2 S 0
satisfies condition (18) for all S′ ⊆ S.
Any S′ ⊆ S falls into one of the following two cases: S′ ⊆ S2 and S′ 6⊆ S2. It suffices
to show (18) in each case.
If S′ ⊆ S2, then αS′ = γS′ . By (19), we know (18) is correct.
If S′ 6⊆ S2, then βS
′ 6= 0. Let γS′ = (γS2)S′ . We know
〈αS′ ,qS′〉 = 〈βS′ ,qS′〉+ δ〈γS′ ,qS′〉.
By Lemma 8.3, 〈βS′ ,qS′〉 < min
d∈D(S′)
〈βS′ ,pS′(d)〉. Since there are finite subsets S′, for
small enough δ,
〈αS′ ,qS′〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S′)
〈βS′ ,pS′(d)〉
≤ min
d∈D(S′)
〈αS′ ,pS′(d)〉,
i.e., (18) holds true.
In summary, this proves Claim 1 and thus q ∈ RIB. Therefore, int(R) ⊆ RIB.
8.5. Proof of Lemma 8.2
First we introduce a further notation. Given a decision d and a user set S, we let
m(d, S) represent the decision that satisfies
— m(d, S) ∈ D(S).
— For users i, j ∈ S or i, j /∈ S, if i has higher priority than j in d, then i also has
higher priority than j in decision m(d, S).
In other words, m(d, S) is the priority decision obtained by modifying decision d to
assign highest priorities to users in S without changing the relative orders in and out
of S, respectively.
Given that the system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, for all i ∈ S, we have that
pi(m(d, S)) ≥ pi(d). (20)
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Given q ∈ C, the goal is to show qS ∈ CS for all subsets of users S. By definition of
C, there exists a convex combination of vectors in P that dominates q, i.e., there exists
{αd|d ∈ D} such that
q 
∑
d∈D
αdp(d),
and αd ≥ 0,
∑
d∈D
αd = 1.
Therefore, for any subset of users S,
qS 
∑
d∈D
αdp
S(d),
which by (20) gives
qS 
∑
d∈D
αdp
S(m(d, S)).
We let xS =
∑
d∈D
αdp
S(m(d, S)). Since m(d, S) ∈ D(S), we know xS ∈ Conv(PS) , and
by definition of CS ,
qS ∈ CS .
8.6. Proof of Lemma 8.3
Given q ∈ int(R), by (12) we know that for all subsets of users S, qS ∈ intS(CS) \ BS .
Given a subset of users S, the goal is to find βS which satisfies the requirements in
Lemma 8.3. In this proof, we focus on the subspace of S.
Since qS ∈ intS(CS), there exists xS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS ≺S xS . Since qS /∈ BS
and xS ∈ Conv(PS) ⊆ BS , we know that connecting qS and xS intersects bdS(BS) at
some point denoted by vS . By the closure property of BS , vS ∈ BS and thus, vS S
qS . Since vS ∈ bdS(BS), we get that vS lies on a supporting hyperplane [Boyd and
Vandenberghe 2009] of BS , and by definition of BS , there exists nonzero normal vector
βS  0 of this supporting hyperplane such that
〈βS ,vS〉 = min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉. (21)
Figure 8 conceptually shows the process of constructing βS . The circles represent
the expected payoff vectors. For simplicity we suppress the superscript S in the figure.
We shall show this βS satisfies the requirements in Lemma 8.3.
larger than
Fig. 8. The process of constructing β when C ∩B equals to Conv(P ) (left figure), and when C ∩B is larger
than Conv(P ) (right figure).
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Since vS ∈ bdS(BS) ⊆ BS , there exists uS ∈ Conv(PS) such that vS  uS , and by
(21), we get that
〈βS ,uS〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉.
The vector uS is also shown in Figure 8.
On the other hand, since uS ∈ Conv(PS), by similar analysis as in (15) we know that
〈βS ,uS〉 ≥ min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉.
Thus,
〈βS ,uS〉 = 〈βS ,vS〉 = min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉,
which implies uSi = vSi if βSi 6= 0. Since vS S qS , for all subset S′ ⊆ S where βS
′ 6= 0,
we have that
〈βS′ ,qS′〉 < 〈βS′ ,uS′〉,
Therefore, to show (17) it suffices to show for all S′ ⊆ S where βS′ 6= 0 that
〈βS′ ,uS′〉 ≤ min
d∈D(S′)
〈βS′ ,pS′(d)〉. (22)
Given uS ∈ Conv(PS), we write uS = ∑
d∈D(S)
cdp
S(d) where cd ≥ 0 and
∑
d∈D(S)
cd = 1.
For all S′ ⊆ S where βS′ 6= 0, we can rewrite 〈βS′ ,uS′〉 as follows,
〈βS′ ,uS′〉 = 〈βS ,uS〉 − 〈βS\S′ ,uS\S′〉
= min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉 −
∑
d∈D(S)
cd〈βS\S
′
,pS\S
′
(d)〉
≤ min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉 − min
d∈D(S)
〈βS\S′ ,pS\S′(d)〉.
To show (22), it suffices to show that
min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉
≤ min
d∈D(S)
〈βS\S′ ,pS\S′(d)〉 (23)
+ min
d∈D(S′)
〈βS′ ,pS′(d)〉. (24)
Suppose d1 ∈ D(S) and d2 ∈ D(S′) are the optimal solutions for (23) and (24),
respectively. Formally,
〈βS\S′ ,pS\S′(d1)〉 = min
d∈D(S)
〈βS\S′ ,pS\S′(d)〉,
〈βS′ ,pS′(d2)〉 = min
d∈D(S′)
〈βS′ ,pS′(d)〉.
We consider the unique decision d3 that satisfies the following: First, d3 ∈ D(S′),
i.e., d3 assigns highest priority to users in S′. Second, the priority ordering for user
subset S′ in d3 are the same as those in d2. Third, the priority ordering for user subset
N \ S′ in d3 are the same as those in d1.
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Since d1 ∈ D(S), we know d3 ∈ D(S) and therefore,
min
d∈D(S)
〈βS ,pS(d)〉 ≤ 〈βS ,pS(d3)〉.
Now it suffices to show that
〈βS ,pS(d3)〉 ≤ 〈βS\S
′
,pS\S
′
(d1)〉+ 〈βS
′
,pS
′
(d2)〉.
This is true because given that the system satisfies monotonicity in payoffs, we can
get that
pS
′
i (d3) ≤ pS
′
i (d2) for i ∈ S′,
and
p
S\S′
i (d3) ≤ pS\S
′
i (d1) for i ∈ S \ S′.
In summary, this proves (22) and thus βS satisfies the conditions in Lemma 8.3.
8.7. Proof of Theorem 3.10
Clearly Fw-LDF ⊆ F ⊆ cl(C). To show int(C) ⊆ Fw-LDF, by (5) it suffices to show int(C) ⊆
int(R).
Given q ∈ int(C), the goal is to show q ∈ int(R), i.e., for all user subsets S,
qS ∈ intS(CS) \BS .
Given a user subset S, by Lemma 8.2 we know qS ∈ CS . Further we can show
qS ∈ intS(CS) since otherwise q ∈ bd(C). By definition of interior and CS , there exists
xS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS ≺S xS .
Suppose qS ∈ BS , by definition there exists yS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS  yS . Now
we get two vectors xS ,yS ∈ Conv(PS) and xS S yS . Since vectors in PS lie on a
hyperplane and xS ,yS ∈ Conv(PS), there exists nonzero αS  0 such that
〈αS ,xS〉 = 〈αS ,yS〉,
which contradicts with xS S yS .
Therefore, qS /∈ BS and thus int(C) ⊆ int(R).
8.8. Proof of Theorem 3.14
Given monotonicity in payoffs, by (5) we know int(R) ⊆ Fw-LDF and F differs from C
by at most a boundary. By the definition of the efficiency ratio, we know
γw-LDF = sup{γ|γF ⊆ Fw-LDF} ≥ sup{γ|γC ⊆ int(R)} = sup{γ|γC ⊆ cl(R)}.
To show γw-LDF ≥ min
S⊆N
σS , it suffices to show sup{γ|γC ⊆ cl(R)} ≥ min
S⊆N
σS , i.e., for
each q ∈ C, we have min
S⊆N
σS · q ∈ cl(R), which is equivalent to showing that for each
q ∈ C, there exists a subset of users S ⊆ N , such that σS · q ∈ cl(R).
Given a q ∈ C, we define λ(q, R) = sup{λ|λq ∈ R} which represents how far the
vector q can extend before it goes beyond the region R and let q(R) = λ(q, R) · q. We
claim there exists a user subset S such that qS(R) ∈ bdS(BS) since otherwise we can
increase λ(q, R) while guaranteeing q(R) is still in R. Next we shall show σS ·q ∈ cl(R),
i.e., λ(q, R) ≥ σS .
Since qS(R) ∈ bdS(BS) ⊆ BS , there exists xS ∈ Conv(PS) such that qS(R)  xS . Since
q ∈ C, by Lemma 8.2 we know qS ∈ CS and thus, there exists yS ∈ Conv(PS) such
that qS  yS .
ACM Trans. Model. Perform. Eval. Comput. Syst., Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:28 Y. Du and G. de Veciana
Given that q(R) = λ(q, R) · q, for any nonzero αS  0, we have that
〈qS(R),αS〉 = λ(q, R) · 〈qS ,αS〉.
By qS(R)  xS and qS  yS , we get that
〈xS ,αS〉 ≤ λ(q, R) · 〈yS ,αS〉.
Since xS ∈ Conv(PS), by similar analysis as in (15) we know 〈xS ,αS〉 ≥
min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉. Similarly we can show 〈yS ,αS〉 ≤ max
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉. Thus,
min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉 ≤ λ(q, R) · max
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉. (25)
Clearly, max
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉 > 0 for any nonzero αS  0.
Since (25) is true for any nonzero αS  0, we get that
λ(q, R) ≥ max
αS0
αS 6=0
min
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉
max
d∈D(S)
〈αS ,pS(d)〉 = σS .
Therefore, for each q ∈ C, there exists a subset of users S ⊆ N such that σS ·q ∈ cl(R),
and thus, γw-LDF ≥ min
S⊆N
σS .
8.9. Proof of Corollary 4.2
By Theorem 3.10, to show w-LDF policies are feasibility optimal, it suffices to show
the system satisfies subset payoff equivalence. To show this, it suffices to show for all
user subsets S ⊆ N and all priority decisions d1,d2 ∈ D(S) that
〈1S ,pS(d1)〉 = 〈1S ,pS(d2)〉.
This is true because we can convert d1 to d2 by repeatedly switching a pair of users
in d1 at each step such that at step k both decisions assign the highest k priorities to
the same users, respectively. By the definition of exchangeable expected payoffs, the
sum of the expected payoffs for users in S remains the same at each step.
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